TATIANA I ALEKSANDER PDF

adminComment(0)

Size Report. DOWNLOAD EPUB Tatiana and Alexander (The Bridge to Holy Cross) · Read more Tatiana Proskouriakoff: Interpreting the Ancient Maya. Tatiana and Alexander read online. Download link: To start the download or read Tatiana and Alexander you must register. Start your FREE month! Tatiana>. To cite this article: Tatiana Zhurzhenko (): The border as pain and remedy: .. In his article in Rzeczpospolita, the Polish minister of culture Aleksander.


Tatiana I Aleksander Pdf

Author:ISSAC PATTINSON
Language:English, Portuguese, French
Country:Austria
Genre:Fiction & Literature
Pages:255
Published (Last):06.10.2015
ISBN:548-9-40470-590-4
ePub File Size:19.42 MB
PDF File Size:8.83 MB
Distribution:Free* [*Register to download]
Downloads:45930
Uploaded by: NOELIA

Borders and Memory Tatiana Zhurzhenko Introduction: A tale of two cities under the auspices of Aleksander Kwasniewski and the freshly elected Viktor . pdf>, accessed 4 November Revolution flyer FINAL FOR fruchbabefonbei.cf in Interwar Japan | Tatjana Jukic ( Zagreb): Revolu- Marie-Josée Lavallée (Montreal): The Reception ( FOY) 'Peaceful Revolution' in Russia | Aleksander Miłosz Panel 4: On. PDF | On Mar 29, , Thibaut Gérard and others published Graphical Abstract. Tatiana Budtova at MINES ParisTech Aleksandr Valerevich Podshivalov.

Historical memory — not only symbols and narratives of the Russian Empire, but also carefully selected Soviet myths — is used in contemporary Russia to legitimize its geopolitical status, national territory, and sphere of influence. Not by accident, some cities on the new Western border of Russia have re-invented themselves as military fortresses, border outposts throughout centuries of Russian history. The EU project is based on the general consensus that historical arguments and victimhood claims do not legitimize border changes.

Instead, mechanisms of reconciliation and cross-border cooperation, protecting minority rights and regional development are promoted as instruments for healing former wounds and reconnecting divided communities. While some historians believe that the Holocaust constitutes a universal basis for European memory, others point to the incompatibility and inequality of West European and East European memories.

Cross-border cooperation projects, euro-regions, and joint cultural events evoke symbols of former regional unity. Sometimes borders are also re-narrated as new sites of European solidarity, as happened in Andau Kovacs During the uprising, this small Austrian near-border village offered thousands of Hungarian refugees temporary shelter, food and clothes.

Fragments of the wired fence still bearing the warning inscriptions are kept as reminders of the past. Several information panels honour the helpfulness of the Austrian officials and population. In this sense, European integration even generates a proliferation of borders, as is the case with Catalonia and Scotland. Borderlands, sites of cruel territorial conflicts and wars in the past, become today attractive tourist destinations for example the Anglo-Scottish border.

European integration has radically changed the functions of national borders and the symbolic meanings attached to them, but borders and borderlands — for various reasons — still remain important sites of memorialization. At the external borders of the European Union, history and memory are not less important. This meaning production becomes more important, the more the institutional borders of Europe are not finalized and open to political struggles Eder Therefore, outside the European Union the remobilization of historical memory becomes an instrument of affirming European identity and striving for EU membership.

He argued that personal memory is always constructed and located in the social environment. By belonging to social groups, individuals learn narratives about their world and engage in repetitive cultural performances which provide continuity between past and present.

Halbwachs introduced the important distinction between autobiographical and historical memory. Communicative memory entails direct contact with people who have lived through a particular time and reaches back three generations at the most.

Cultural memory is indirect and transmitted through cultural artefacts such as school books, films, photography, and museum exhibitions.

Holocaust survivors ibid. National memory is therefore hierarchical; various social groups compete for access to the public sphere in order to establish the hegemony of their narrative. Such sites include geographical places, historical events, heroic figures, commemorative rituals, works of art, symbols, monuments and memorials, archives and museums, institutions Nora Although often controversial or invested with ambivalent meaning, common sites of memory are crucial attributes of a nation.

You might also like: ROMANE DE DRAGOSTE PDF GRATIS

In the process of nation building, politics of memory often becomes a battlefield for competing interpretations and narratives of the past. The integration of a new nation by means of memory politics includes changes in school curriculum, particularly in history teaching, the revision of the official calendar new national holidays, jubilees and so on , creating a new pantheon of heroes and martyrs, and reshaping the commemorative landscape new monuments, memorial sites, changes in urban toponymics.

State-led politics of memory is an important part of domestic policy aimed at the cultural integration and construction of national identity; it also helps to legitimize foreign policy orientations.

For example, the opening of the Museum of Soviet occupation in Tbilisi Georgia in was supposed to help move the country from the ambiguous Eurasian geopolitical space to the European or rather Euro-Atlantic one Zhurzhenko As a rule, collective memory is related to territory. In the modern world the dominant form of territoriality is still the nation state, which has sovereign power on a particular territory. This completely changed the nature of territory, especially the integrity of its borders.

Anssi Paasi demonstrated how Finnish national territory and particularly the Finnish-Russian border was constructed through the twentieth century by a variety of instruments geography and history textbooks, maps, tourist brochures and images of everyday life.

Some authors, however, point to the limitations of a constructivist and elite-centred approach. Smith introduces the notion of ethnoscapes which … cover a wider extent of land, present a tradition of continuity and are held to constitute an ethnic unity, because the terrain invested with collective significance is felt to be integral to a particular historical culture, community or ethnie, and the ethnic community is seen as an intrinsic part of that poetic landscape.

In the context of a national revival, the linking together of history and territory is essential for the conceptualisation of a land as a national homeland. The spacialization of historical myth and the mythologization of space in terms of history are two sides of the same cultural coin. Historian Serhii Plokhy demonstrated the spacialisation of historical myth in the case of Ukrainian nation building Plokhy Ukrainian Cossackdom was the foundational myth of the Ukrainian nation throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Originally related to the limited territory of Sich on the lower Dnieper, the Cossack myth has successfully expanded to other Ukrainian ethnic lands. Borderland territories have often been exposed to changing powers, to military and political expansion of the neighbours and to ethnic and religious conflicts.

Thus, borderlands are not marginal places but central sites of power where the meaning of national identity is created and contested. In his study of the US-Mexico border, Martinez suggests a useful classification of borderlands according to the criteria of intensity of cross-border contacts and the mode of relations between neighbouring countries: As these categories do not represent stable statuses but dynamic tendencies and open options we can apply this classification to the variety of memory politics in border regions.

The visitor is confronted with a plurality of tongues commenting on the history of the region in French, German and Alsatian dialect.

Passing through spaces devoted to Nazification, repression and resistance, the visitors enter a bright hall symbolizing German-French reconciliation and the idea of a united Europe.

If, however, the process of nationalization of collective memory aimed at the cultural integration of borderland inhabitants into the core nation prevails, interdependent borderlands change into coexistent or even alienated ones. The two cities constituted an integrated geographic and social space. Ivangorod, the former satellite of Narva on the Russian side, has been cut from the common infrastructure and social network and turned into a Russian border town.

Olga Brednikova analyzed the changes in the commemorative landscapes of these two cities and compares the new narratives of place created by popular representations of history such as museums, monuments and souvenirs.

While the historical narrative of Narva is pluralistic and fragmented, more entertaining than didactic, Ivangorod presents itself as a scene of heroic Russian history, a Russian border fortress. Sometimes, the new border itself becomes the main factor of identity formation and re-memorialization, as has happened with the Setos, a small ethnic group traditionally living in the Estonian-Russian borderlands south of the Peipus Pskov lake.

At the same time old borders, which disappeared from the political map a long time ago, still continue to exist as symbolic boundaries dividing a nation along the lines of historical memory. On the one hand, regional differences in economic culture and political behaviour correspond with the borders of partitions, on the other hand, symbolic conflicts over identity politics and the interpretation of history affect debates on regional development and post-communist restructuring.

But the most recent and telling example is the East-West German border. Having disappeared as a political border, it has persisted and indeed been reinvented as a cultural boundary between East and West Germany. Political anthropologist Daphne Berdahl demonstrates this with the example of the small Eastern German village, Kella, at the former border with Western Germany, in the first years after reunification.

Moreover, relations between the national centre and the periphery, the level of political centralisation, the degree of consolidation of the regional elites, and the influence of regional lobbies in the capital set the frame of memory politics in border regions. Local elites, political parties and NGOs, churches, professional associations historians, architects, journalists , ethnic and cultural minorities play an important role in memory politics.

Thus, re- shaping collective memory in democratic societies assumes a multiplicity of political actors and their interaction. I will discuss here two cases which illustrate the politics of memory in borderlands as a complex, hierarchical, and multi-scalar process.

As Ukrainian military formations attempted to take control of Lviv, Polish volunteer groups were formed in response. Hundreds of young Poles and Ukrainians were killed in this conflict.

As the Polish military came to the rescue from Cracow, Poland gained control of Lviv. The restoration of the memorial became possible only after when the authorities of independent Ukraine approved the Polish initiative. Good Polish-Ukrainian relations Warsaw was the first to recognize the independent Ukrainian state created a solid basis for historical reconciliation, and the official reopening of the memorial in Lviv under the supervision of the two presidents was supposed to crown this process.

Characteristically, the main controversy emerged not between Kyiv and Warsaw, but between Kyiv and Lviv. The Lviv city council objected to the symbolics of the memorial and repeatedly said it would not permit the opening of a Polish cemetery which glorified the Polish Army.

Rather, Lviv politicians used this opportunity to present themselves as true Ukrainian patriots and to sabotage the politics of President Leonid Kuchma, extremely unpopular in Western Ukraine. At the same time the memorial became a site of internal political struggle, first of all between the presidential administration, which tried to monopolize the symbolic capital of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, and its political opponents from Western Ukraine.

Eventually the conflict was resolved and the official reopening of the memorial took place in July under the auspices of Aleksander Kwasniewski and the freshly elected Viktor Yushchenko. That a compromise between Kyiv and Lviv was reached was certainly due to the high support the new president enjoyed in Western Ukraine. However, this memorial site of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is not without ambivalence.

To counterbalance the impressive Polish memorial symbolically, the Ukrainian side has started a major reconstruction and expansion of the neighbouring Memorial to the Warriors of the Ukrainian Galician Army. With the reburial of some Ukrainian military and political leaders the graveyard has become a kind of regional pantheon of national heroes, supporting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian claim for Lviv.

In addition, a new impressive monument to Stepan Bandera, the leader of the UPA who is considered in Poland to be responsible for the massacre of thousands of Polish civilians in , was erected in Lviv in It seems the ghosts of the old nationalist rivalry are not dead.

They can be easily evoked and politically instrumentalized again. Bodies of the victims were thrown into these pits. During the Cold War Italian politicians were reluctant to raise this issue for fear of irritating Yugoslavia, seen as a buffer between the Soviet Bloc and Western Europe. In exchange, the nation could comfortably forget the war crimes committed by Italian fascists and military in the Balkans, in Libya and Ethiopia. The myth of antifascist resistance helped consolidate the nation and mobilize it for reconstruction while cleaning up the image of Italy from the earlier alliance with Hitler.

Only in Trieste, which has always been a stronghold of radical right and nationalist forces, have the memories of the foibe been cultivated in the exile milieu. Under the conservative government of Silvio Berlusconi, and on the initiative of Gianfranco Fini, leader of the far right Alleanza Nazionale, the Italian Parliament approved a law which declared February 10 the National Memorial Day of the Exiles and Foibe.

Already in the Risiera di San Sabba, the only Nazi extermination camp on the territory of Italy, became a national memorial site and in was transformed into a museum. The Basovizza foiba, which became a symbol of this crime, was actually not a natural karst hole but a man-made mine. For the left, the Risiera has symbolized the link between Italian fascism, Nazism and the Holocaust.

The memorial to the Foibe of Basovizza, which was erected in and had only local relevance for a long time, reflects an alternative memory of the war and a revisionist approach to its history.

As a site of nationalist pilgrimage, it has symbolized for the far right the dangers of Slavic communism Grainger. In Basovizza was also given the status of a national monument.

The leaders of the left for example Walter Veltroni recently visited the Foibe of Basovizza and admitted the responsibility of the Communists for silencing the issue during the past decades.

At the same time, left politicians see the discussion as being manipulated by the right wing parties and consider it an attempt to compromize Italian anti-fascism and resistance.

MATEC Web of Conferences

While reflecting basic shifts in Italian domestic politics, the issue of the foibe atrocities raised diplomatic tensions between Italy and Croatia. The Croatian president Stipe Mesic, in turn, talked about racism and a desire for political revenge. Conclusion Collective memories, historical narratives, myths and symbols are usually attached to a particular territory making it unique and indispensable for a certain group.

Borderlands are central in this process as they are often contested by neighbours, become an object of political and military expansion, or a site of ethnic conflicts.

In any case, borderlands are not just peripheries but central sites of state power where national identities are created, challenged, and reinvented, reflecting local needs and external geopolitical pressures. Depending on interstate relations and the dynamics of cross-border contacts, politics of memory in the borderlands can support territorial claims, serve the symbolic demarcation of the national territory, or become an instrument of reconciliation and transnational cooperation.

Politics of memory in the borderlands involves a multiplicity of actors on the national, regional and international levels, whose interests and identities depend on the geo- political context and are constructed through negotiations and conflicts. European integration is built on the idea of overcoming former hostilities and coping with a difficult past.

References Assmann, J. The EU project is based on the general consensus that historical arguments and victimhood claims do not legitimize border changes. Instead, mechanisms of reconciliation and cross-border cooperation, protecting minority rights and regional development are promoted as instruments for healing former wounds and reconnecting divided communities. While some historians believe that the Holocaust constitutes a universal basis for European memory, others point to the incompatibility and inequality of West European and East European memories.

Cross-border cooperation projects, euro-regions, and joint cultural events evoke symbols of former regional unity. Sometimes borders are also re-narrated as new sites of European solidarity, as happened in Andau Kovacs During the uprising, this small Austrian near-border village offered thousands of Hungarian refugees temporary shelter, food and clothes. Fragments of the wired fence still bearing the warning inscriptions are kept as reminders of the past.

Several information panels honour the helpfulness of the Austrian officials and population. In this sense, European integration even generates a proliferation of borders, as is the case with Catalonia and Scotland. Borderlands, sites of cruel territorial conflicts and wars in the past, become today attractive tourist destinations for example the Anglo-Scottish border.

European integration has radically changed the functions of national borders and the symbolic meanings attached to them, but borders and borderlands — for various reasons — still remain important sites of memorialization.

At the external borders of the European Union, history and memory are not less important. This meaning production becomes more important, the more the institutional borders of Europe are not finalized and open to political struggles Eder Therefore, outside the European Union the remobilization of historical memory becomes an instrument of affirming European identity and striving for EU membership.

Paullina Simons - The Bronze Horseman - Tatiana & Alexander

He argued that personal memory is always constructed and located in the social environment. By belonging to social groups, individuals learn narratives about their world and engage in repetitive cultural performances which provide continuity between past and present.

Halbwachs introduced the important distinction between autobiographical and historical memory. Communicative memory entails direct contact with people who have lived through a particular time and reaches back three generations at the most.

Cultural memory is indirect and transmitted through cultural artefacts such as school books, films, photography, and museum exhibitions. Holocaust survivors ibid. National memory is therefore hierarchical; various social groups compete for access to the public sphere in order to establish the hegemony of their narrative.

Such sites include geographical places, historical events, heroic figures, commemorative rituals, works of art, symbols, monuments and memorials, archives and museums, institutions Nora Although often controversial or invested with ambivalent meaning, common sites of memory are crucial attributes of a nation.

In the process of nation building, politics of memory often becomes a battlefield for competing interpretations and narratives of the past. The integration of a new nation by means of memory politics includes changes in school curriculum, particularly in history teaching, the revision of the official calendar new national holidays, jubilees and so on , creating a new pantheon of heroes and martyrs, and reshaping the commemorative landscape new monuments, memorial sites, changes in urban toponymics.

State-led politics of memory is an important part of domestic policy aimed at the cultural integration and construction of national identity; it also helps to legitimize foreign policy orientations. For example, the opening of the Museum of Soviet occupation in Tbilisi Georgia in was supposed to help move the country from the ambiguous Eurasian geopolitical space to the European or rather Euro-Atlantic one Zhurzhenko As a rule, collective memory is related to territory.

In the modern world the dominant form of territoriality is still the nation state, which has sovereign power on a particular territory. This completely changed the nature of territory, especially the integrity of its borders.

Anssi Paasi demonstrated how Finnish national territory and particularly the Finnish-Russian border was constructed through the twentieth century by a variety of instruments geography and history textbooks, maps, tourist brochures and images of everyday life. Some authors, however, point to the limitations of a constructivist and elite-centred approach.

Smith introduces the notion of ethnoscapes which … cover a wider extent of land, present a tradition of continuity and are held to constitute an ethnic unity, because the terrain invested with collective significance is felt to be integral to a particular historical culture, community or ethnie, and the ethnic community is seen as an intrinsic part of that poetic landscape.

In the context of a national revival, the linking together of history and territory is essential for the conceptualisation of a land as a national homeland. The spacialization of historical myth and the mythologization of space in terms of history are two sides of the same cultural coin.

Historian Serhii Plokhy demonstrated the spacialisation of historical myth in the case of Ukrainian nation building Plokhy Ukrainian Cossackdom was the foundational myth of the Ukrainian nation throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Originally related to the limited territory of Sich on the lower Dnieper, the Cossack myth has successfully expanded to other Ukrainian ethnic lands.

Borderland territories have often been exposed to changing powers, to military and political expansion of the neighbours and to ethnic and religious conflicts.

Tatiana and Alexander

Thus, borderlands are not marginal places but central sites of power where the meaning of national identity is created and contested. In his study of the US-Mexico border, Martinez suggests a useful classification of borderlands according to the criteria of intensity of cross-border contacts and the mode of relations between neighbouring countries: alienated, coexistent, interdependent and integrated borderlands. As these categories do not represent stable statuses but dynamic tendencies and open options we can apply this classification to the variety of memory politics in border regions.

The visitor is confronted with a plurality of tongues commenting on the history of the region in French, German and Alsatian dialect.

Passing through spaces devoted to Nazification, repression and resistance, the visitors enter a bright hall symbolizing German-French reconciliation and the idea of a united Europe. If, however, the process of nationalization of collective memory aimed at the cultural integration of borderland inhabitants into the core nation prevails, interdependent borderlands change into coexistent or even alienated ones.

The two cities constituted an integrated geographic and social space. Ivangorod, the former satellite of Narva on the Russian side, has been cut from the common infrastructure and social network and turned into a Russian border town. Olga Brednikova analyzed the changes in the commemorative landscapes of these two cities and compares the new narratives of place created by popular representations of history such as museums, monuments and souvenirs.

While the historical narrative of Narva is pluralistic and fragmented, more entertaining than didactic, Ivangorod presents itself as a scene of heroic Russian history, a Russian border fortress. Sometimes, the new border itself becomes the main factor of identity formation and re-memorialization, as has happened with the Setos, a small ethnic group traditionally living in the Estonian-Russian borderlands south of the Peipus Pskov lake. At the same time old borders, which disappeared from the political map a long time ago, still continue to exist as symbolic boundaries dividing a nation along the lines of historical memory.

On the one hand, regional differences in economic culture and political behaviour correspond with the borders of partitions, on the other hand, symbolic conflicts over identity politics and the interpretation of history affect debates on regional development and post-communist restructuring.

But the most recent and telling example is the East-West German border. Having disappeared as a political border, it has persisted and indeed been reinvented as a cultural boundary between East and West Germany. Political anthropologist Daphne Berdahl demonstrates this with the example of the small Eastern German village, Kella, at the former border with Western Germany, in the first years after reunification. Moreover, relations between the national centre and the periphery, the level of political centralisation, the degree of consolidation of the regional elites, and the influence of regional lobbies in the capital set the frame of memory politics in border regions.

Local elites, political parties and NGOs, churches, professional associations historians, architects, journalists , ethnic and cultural minorities play an important role in memory politics.

Book Preview

Thus, re- shaping collective memory in democratic societies assumes a multiplicity of political actors and their interaction. I will discuss here two cases which illustrate the politics of memory in borderlands as a complex, hierarchical, and multi-scalar process. As Ukrainian military formations attempted to take control of Lviv, Polish volunteer groups were formed in response. Hundreds of young Poles and Ukrainians were killed in this conflict.

As the Polish military came to the rescue from Cracow, Poland gained control of Lviv. The restoration of the memorial became possible only after when the authorities of independent Ukraine approved the Polish initiative.

Good Polish-Ukrainian relations Warsaw was the first to recognize the independent Ukrainian state created a solid basis for historical reconciliation, and the official reopening of the memorial in Lviv under the supervision of the two presidents was supposed to crown this process.

Characteristically, the main controversy emerged not between Kyiv and Warsaw, but between Kyiv and Lviv. The Lviv city council objected to the symbolics of the memorial and repeatedly said it would not permit the opening of a Polish cemetery which glorified the Polish Army. Rather, Lviv politicians used this opportunity to present themselves as true Ukrainian patriots and to sabotage the politics of President Leonid Kuchma, extremely unpopular in Western Ukraine.

At the same time the memorial became a site of internal political struggle, first of all between the presidential administration, which tried to monopolize the symbolic capital of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, and its political opponents from Western Ukraine.

Eventually the conflict was resolved and the official reopening of the memorial took place in July under the auspices of Aleksander Kwasniewski and the freshly elected Viktor Yushchenko.

That a compromise between Kyiv and Lviv was reached was certainly due to the high support the new president enjoyed in Western Ukraine.

However, this memorial site of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is not without ambivalence. To counterbalance the impressive Polish memorial symbolically, the Ukrainian side has started a major reconstruction and expansion of the neighbouring Memorial to the Warriors of the Ukrainian Galician Army.

With the reburial of some Ukrainian military and political leaders the graveyard has become a kind of regional pantheon of national heroes, supporting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian claim for Lviv. In addition, a new impressive monument to Stepan Bandera, the leader of the UPA who is considered in Poland to be responsible for the massacre of thousands of Polish civilians in , was erected in Lviv in It seems the ghosts of the old nationalist rivalry are not dead.

They can be easily evoked and politically instrumentalized again. Bodies of the victims were thrown into these pits. During the Cold War Italian politicians were reluctant to raise this issue for fear of irritating Yugoslavia, seen as a buffer between the Soviet Bloc and Western Europe. In exchange, the nation could comfortably forget the war crimes committed by Italian fascists and military in the Balkans, in Libya and Ethiopia.

The myth of antifascist resistance helped consolidate the nation and mobilize it for reconstruction while cleaning up the image of Italy from the earlier alliance with Hitler.

Only in Trieste, which has always been a stronghold of radical right and nationalist forces, have the memories of the foibe been cultivated in the exile milieu.

Under the conservative government of Silvio Berlusconi, and on the initiative of Gianfranco Fini, leader of the far right Alleanza Nazionale, the Italian Parliament approved a law which declared February 10 the National Memorial Day of the Exiles and Foibe.

Already in the Risiera di San Sabba, the only Nazi extermination camp on the territory of Italy, became a national memorial site and in was transformed into a museum.Holy Feast and Holy Fast. Simons' trilogy takes a turn for the historical, rather than the romantic, which is just what I was wanting from this series from the start.

Tantucci, sqq. Il Processo Castellano. Friday, October 6 Panel 6: Olesya Yakushenkova, Prof.

DORTHY from Durham
I love studying docunments unnecessarily. Please check my other articles. I absolutely love medieval football.
>